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MULTI-PARTY, MULTI-CLAIM LITIGATION IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: THE UNIFYING INFLUENCE
OF "JUDICIAL ECONOMY"
by Bill Gaus
The phrase "judicial economy" is often used to describe the process of
diminishing the total amount of litigation necessary to settle a dispute. If
there is a dispute with a party asserting several related claims against another, or against several parties, it will often be desirable that all these
claims are consolidated in a single action before a single judge. Getting all
related claims and all interested parties before a federal court is often a
problem because of the limited nature of federal jurisdiction.1 However,
some recent developments in multi-party, multi-claim litigation have made
it easier to settle all relevant aspects of a case properly before a federal
court. The recent cases do not yet form a completely consistent scheme for
handling multi-party, multi-claim litigation. There remain anomolous
rules which exclude additional parties or claims which could conveniently

be included.' But there has been widespread recognition of the fact that a

single rule, or a rule for each situation, which categorically forbids or
requires the exercise of jurisdiction over an additional facet of a suite
cannot work as well as a discretionary framework which leaves the courts
free to determine each case as a unique mixture of legal and equitable

considerations. It has been said that this shift has caused an expansion of
federal jurisdiction.4 A careful examination of the cases reveals that the
use of the word "expansion" is not accurate.
I.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PENDENT JURISDICTION

A. Pendent Jurisdiction Proper
Since early in the nineteenth century, it has been settled that when a
party invokes the jurisdiction of the federal court, asserting a right under

a federal statute or under the Constitution, the federal court is not limited
to a decision of that single federal question. In 1824, in Osborn v.Bank
of the United States' the Supreme Court held that in deciding a federal
' "[A federal court] is a court of limited jurisdiction, it must, on its own motion, raise such
jurisdictional questions as may be present even though they are not raised by the parties. This
court is obliged to proceed on the assumption that it lacks jurisdiction until it is affirmatively
demonstrated that jurisdiction exists." United States v. General Ins. Co. of America, 247 F. Supp.
543, 544 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (citations omitted). See Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.
1968); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
2See notes 3, 43, 101 infra, and accompanying text.
' For example, in a diversity action, the defendant may state a claim against a third-party
defendant who is not diverse to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff may not state a claim against that
same party. Schwab v. Erie L.R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Ayoub v. Helm's
Express, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Palumbo v. W. Md. Ry., 271 F. Supp. 361
(D. Md. 1967).
" 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 18.07 (2d ed. 1969); Lowenfels, Pendent Jurisdiction and
the Federal Securities Acts, 67 COLUM. L. Rev. 474 (1967); Shakman, The New Pendent Juris-

diction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L.
Jurisdiction, 81 HARv. L. REV. 657 (1968).
522 U.S.

(9 Wheat.)

738 (1824).

REV.

262 (1968); Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent
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question, the federal court had the power to decide any subsidiary point
of law, federal or non-federal, necessary to dispose of the claim. Rejecting
the argument that the power to decide cases arising under the Constitution
or laws of the United States limited the federal judiciary to only those
questions requiring construction of the Constitution or the federal law
and no other, Chief Justice Marshall held:
If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title or right set up

by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the constitution or law
of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construction, provided the
facts necessary to support the action be made out, then all the other questions must be decided as incidental to this, which gives that jurisdiction.
Under this construction, the judicial power of the Union extends effectively
and beneficially to that most important class of cases, which depend on the
character of the cause. On the opposite construction, the judicial power
never can be extended to a whole case, as expressed by the constitution, but
to those parts of cases only which present the particular question involving
the construction of the constitution or the law."
The Osborn decision was the beginning of the doctrine of "pendent jurisdiction," the concept that when a federal question is properly before the
court, other questions which could not stand alone can be decided.
The theory of pendent jurisdiction, as the name implies, requires that
the federal and the non-federal question be connected to each other by
some relation other than that they just happen to be bones of contention
between the same two parties. The case of Hum v. Oursler7 provided a
clear statement of the type of non-federal claim which could be litigated
as "pendent" to a federal claim. There, the plaintiff had a copyrighted
and an uncopyrighted version of a play, both of which were shown to
the defendant. The defendant incorporated ideas from the two manuscripts into a similar production already partially written. The plaintiff
claimed a violation of the copyright laws with respect to the copyrighted
manuscript, and unfair competition with respect to both manuscripts.
In holding that the claim of unfair competition should not have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the Court described the limits of pendent
jurisdiction in the following words:
[T]he rule does not go so far to as permit a federal court to assume jurisdiction of a separate and distinct nonfederal cause of action because it is joined

in the same complaint with a federal cause of action. The distinction to be
observed is between a case where two distinct grounds in support of a single
cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question,
and a case where two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged, one
only of which is federal in character. In the former, where the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court, even
though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and
dispose of the case upon the nonfederal ground; in the latter it may not do
so upon the nonfederal cause of action.8
The Court, applying this rule to the facts of the Hurn case, held that as
6 Id. at

822.

7289 U.S. 238 (1933).
8id. at 245-46.
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to the copyrighted manuscript, there was jurisdiction in the federal court
to hear the unfair competition claim, since it was pendent to the copyright claim, but that there was no jurisdiction to hear the unfair competition claim with respect to the uncopyrighted manuscript.
The Hurn case became the definitive statement of the limits of pendent
jurisdiction and remained so for thirty-three years until UMW v. Gibbs.9
In Gibbs the plaintiff had been hired as a mine superintendent during
a time of inter-union rivalry. He had attempted to open a mine, using
members of the Southern Labor Union, a rival of the United Mine Workers (UMW). Violence, allegedly caused by members of the UMW, erupted at the mine. In a suit against the UMW, the superintendent alleged
a violation of section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 '0 by reason of the pressure placed upon his employer to discharge
him, and a violation of state tort law by reason of the violent methods
used by the UMW. The facts necessary to establish the section 303 claim
were not identical to those necessary to establish the state tort claim, for
proof of violence was not a prerequisite to recovery under section 303.
Reviewing the rule of Hurn v. Oursler, and noting that some lower court
decisions had interpreted Hum as requiring that the facts necessary to
establish the federal and non-federal claims had to be identical for there
to be an occasion for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction," Mr. Justice
Brennan described the scope of pendent jurisdiction in the following

words:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there
is a claim 'arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . .' and
the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion
that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional
'case.' The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject
The state and federal claims must dematter jurisdiction on the court ....
rive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without
regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he
would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then,
assuming substantiality
of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts
1
to hear the whole. 2
This formulation of the rule enlarges the possible scope of pendent jurisdiction, and it is certainly true that this test will include non-federal
claims that would not fit comfortably the language of Hurn. But the Court
in Gibbs added another significant dimension to its decision, holding that
this power did not have to be exercised by the federal court in each case,
thus leaving a wide zone of discretion into which most subsequent cases
have fallen." If, in the opinion of the court, judicial economy and fair9383 U.S. 715 (1966).
"029 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1964).
"See Denys Fisher Ltd. v. Louis Marx & Co., 306 F. Supp. 956, 960 (N.D.W. Va. 1969), and
cases cited therein; 3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 18.07, at 1901 n.19 (2d ed. 1969); Note,
UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV. 657, 660-62 (1968).
"2383 U.S. at 725 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).
a""That power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist. It has con-

sistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's
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ness to the litigants, or considerations of comity, seem to militate against
the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, there is no requirement that the federal court decide the non-federal claim. The Court also stated that the inquiry concerning whether pendent jurisdiction should be considered is
never a closed question, but one which can be reconsidered as important
facts emerge, such as the relative importance of the federal and non-federal
claims or the amount of time already invested in the non-federal claim."
Substantiality of the Federal Claim. For a federal court to hear a pendent
non-federal claim, it is necessary only that the federal claim have "substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court."" That
requirement fulfilled, pendent jurisdiction is a discretionary question, not
a jurisdictional one. The requirement of substantiality is an easy one to
fill." Some courts, both before and after Gibbs, have felt that the federal
claim should be at least substantial enough to state a claim on which relief can be granted, so that if a federal claim were dismissed for failure
to state a claim, a state law claim appended to it would also be dismissed.'
Others require that the federal claim be viable until the time of trial,"
though this view has been rejected by the Supreme Court." Though the
results of the cases are most reasonable, it would be better if it were made
clear that the pendent claim's dismissal is not based on the inability of the
federal claim to pass a certain fail-safe point, but rather is based on discretionary considerations, such as greater expertise on the point in the
state courts, 0 a heavy additional burden of facts to be proved for the
non-federal claim to be established,' or an insufficient commitment of
right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state
claims, even though bound to apply state law to them .. ..'"Id. at 726 (footnote omitted). See
Patrum v. City of Greensburg, 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970);
Shannon v. United States, 417 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1969); Hall v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.,
312 F. Supp. 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Rogers v. Valentine, 306 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Sauls v. Hutto, 304 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. La. 1969); Litvak Meat Co. v. Denver Union Stock Yard
Co., 303 F. Supp. 715 (D. Colo. 1969); Collidotronics, Inc. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp.
978 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
14383 U.S. at 726-27; Sauls v. Hutto, 304 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. La. 1969); see Shannon v.
United States, 417 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1969); Hall v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 312 F.
Supp. 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Iding v. Anaston, 266 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Il1. 1967); United
States v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 254 F. Supp. 637 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Note, UMW v. Gibbs and
Pendent Jnrisdiction, 81 HARv. L. REv. 657, 664 (1968).
1"383 U.S. at 725; see Rogers v. Valentine, 306 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
7
" Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1969); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d
764 (2d Cir. 1964); Dixon v. Martin, 260 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1958); Denys Fisher Ltd. v.
Louis Marx & Co., 306 F. Supp. 956 (N.D.W. Va. 1969); Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 300
F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Robbins v. Banner Indus., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Fullerton v. Monongahala Connecting R.R., 242 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
" Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. General
Ins. Co. of America, 247 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
"See note 36 infra, and accompanying text.
2''Patrum v. City of Greensburg, 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990
(1970); Rogers v. Valentine, 306 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Catalano v. Department of
Hosps., 299 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Chapiewsky v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 297 F. Supp.
33 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Collidotronics, Inc. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Pa.
1968); Brody v. McCoy, 259 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
"See Robinson & Sons v. Mister Donut of America, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 99 (D. Mass. 1967);
Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966).
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the resources of the litigants or the court to justify continuing with the
case. 2 It is these and other equitable variables, and not a lack of jurisdiction over the pendent claim, which require dismissal.
Courts have been similarly split on the question of a non-federal claim
properly appended to a federal claim which appears substantial at the
time of filing the complaint, but which has been mooted, abandoned, or
shown to be insubstantial in the pre-trial proceedings. In Gibbs, the Court
stated that "if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though
not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well."' This was interpreted by some courts to mean that the
power of the court to hear the non-federal claim ended with dismissal of
the federal claim." However, the passage quoted appeared in that portion
of the Gibbs decision which describes conditions under which a state claim
might be dismissed as a matter of discretion. Thus, in a compelling case, a
court could decide a pendent non-federal claim, even if the federal claim
has been dismissed before trial. This view is advocated by Professor
Moore, 25 and has prevailed in some courts. " The Supreme Court finally

resolved the issue in the case of Rosado v. Wyman'
In Rosado a welfare recipient challenged the New York social services
law 8 on the ground that it violated the equal protection clause by providing lesser payments to welfare recipients in Nassau County than it provided to New York City residents. To that constitutional claim was appended a claim that the law was in conflict with the Social Security Act. 2
A three-judge federal panel was convened,"0 but while the panel was deliberating the claim, the New York statute was amended to allow payments to Nassau County residents in amounts equal to those provided to
New York City residents. This mooted the equal protection claim. The
pendent claim, that the law was in conflict with the Social Security Act,
was unaffected by the amendment. The three-judge panel, considering it
improper to remain in session to, hear the pendent claim, remanded the case
to a single federal judge, who decided the pendent claim favorably to the
plaintiffs." The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit split three ways
in reversing the judgment of the district court." The opinion of the court
held that the federal court lost jurisdiction of the pendent claim when the
constitutional issue was mooted. A concurring opinion held that the single
" Hall v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 312 F. Supp. 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Brody v. McCoy,
259 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
"383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
24
See Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Kahan v.
Rosentiel, 300 F. Supp. 447 (D. Del. 1969); Erling v. Powell, 298 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.S.D. 1969);
cf. United States v. General Ins. Co. of America, 247 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
253A J. MOORE, FEOERAL PRACTICE 5 18.07, at 1952 (2d ed. 1969).
21 Collidotronics, Inc. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Scoville v.
Board of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Strickland
Transp. Co., 270 F. Supp. 264 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Iding v. Anaston, 266 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D.
Ill. 1967).
27397 U.S. 397 (1970).
2'N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW § 131-a (McKinney Supp. 1970).
2942 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (Supp. V, 1969).
'"The panel was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1965).
15Rosado v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
"Rosado

v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969).
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judge had the power to hear the pendent claim, but that he should have
dismissed it as an exercise of discretion." The dissent argued that not only
was there power to hear the pendent claim, but that the district court
was correct in exercising that power. 4 In a six-to-two decision, the Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the constitutional claim did not
deprive the district court of jurisdiction over the non-federal claim."
While indicating that dismissal of the federal claim on the grounds of
insubstantiality might require dismissal of the pendent claim, the Court
stated: "We are not willing to defeat the common-sense policy of pendent
jurisdiction-the conservation of judicial energy and the avoidance of
multiplicity of litigation-by a conceptual approach that would require
jurisdiction over the primary claim at all stages as a prerequisite to resolution of the pendent claim. The Court has shunned this view. '
Criticisms of Revised Pendent Jurisdiction.The change in the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction brought about by Gibbs has received both acclaim and
criticism on the grounds that it is an expansion of pendent jurisdiction. 7
In the view of its critics, pendent jurisdiction should be confined to cases
where the decision of the federal claim necessarily decides the issues of the
state claim, or where decision of the state claim is necessary to prevent
later state court litigation that would undermine the federal decision. 8
Under this view, a party having a federal and a state claim that ordinarily
should be tried together and who wishes to avoid a bifurcated lawsuit
would usually be forced into the: state court. Proponents of this strict
view of pendent jurisdiction argue that such a rule would not defeat the
desire for judicial economy, because a party who wishes a single lawsuit
for his two claims has a forum that allows it-the state court."8 However,
such criticism leans too heavily on the maxim that federal jurisdiction
should not be expanded by loose interpretations of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or the jurisdictional statutes. It is true that the federal
courts are not to use the rules to expand their jurisdiction." Neither are
they at war with litigants who prefer the federal forum. If the litigant
has the necessary prerequisites to proceed before a federal tribunal in the

first instance, he is likely to pursue his case until he gets such a ruling as he
can. The federal judge, in deciding whether to hear the state claim, must
consider all the relevant facts, including the fact that the litigant is now
before him in the federal court ready to proceed to trial of his federal
claim. The fact that at some earlier point the litigant could have made a

choice that would have allowed him to have a unified lawsuit in another
forum must not be substituted for the present reality that the suit will

be bifurcated if the federal court refuses to hear the pendent claim.
"4 Id. at 180.
1 1d. at 181.
"' Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
MId. at 405.
37See note 4 supra.
38 Shakman, note 4 supra, at 285-86.
39 Id.
0
' See FED. R. Civ. P. 82; Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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B. Joinder of Parties Under a Theory of Pendent Jurisdiction
Pendent jurisdiction developed as a doctrine of federal question jurisdiction. Properly spoken of, it relates only to joinder of related claims
against the same defendants in federal question suits." Joinder of parties
is governed by several of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' and by
miscellaneous doctrines of case law.'
Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflects the modern
view that parties should be allowed to be joined if there is a common
question of law or fact in the claims by or against them." But since federal courts are not available to every litigant, it is not enough that the two
parties have a common question of law or fact. Each party must be able
independently to satisfy jurisdictional requirements." Some recent cases,
however, have been making exceptions to this rule, using the Gibbs case
as authority. Though the difference between joinder of claims, where
pendent jurisdiction is applicible, and joinder of parties, where pendent
jurisdiction is not applicable, should be clear enough, an examination of
the cases will show why the doctrine has begun to appear in joinder-ofparty cases.

Joinder of Plaintiffs. In Borror v. Sharon Steel Co." the deceased was
killed by an explosion at the plant of a Pennsylvania corporation. The
plaintiff, Borror, was a citizen of West Virginia and administrator of the
estate. Borror brought two actions against the steel company. One was
based on the Pennsylvania Survival Act," under which the proceeds of
any recovery would be paid into the estate of the deceased, and the other
was an action under the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Act," under
which the proceeds would be paid to the parents of the deceased. The
steel company conceded that there was diversity for the action under the
Survival Act, and did not contest the recovery under that statute. However, it challenged the jurisdiction of the court over the wrongful death
' Tucker v. Shaw, 308 F. Supp. I (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Lawes v. Nutter, 292 F. Supp. 890
(S.D. Tex. 1968).
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 14, 19, 20, 24.
" E.g., the requirement of absolute diversity. This familiar doctrine requires that for diversity
jurisdiction to exist, all plaintiffs must be diverse to all defendants. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss,
1 U.S. (3 Cranch) 575 (1806); Vanderbloom v. Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Ark. 1969);
United States v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 254 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law
or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action. All persons . . . may be
joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally,
or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question
of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
453A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 20.07, at 2821 (2d ed. 1969); see Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 1 U.S. (3 Cranch) 575 (1806); Schwab v. Erie L.R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa.
1969); Ayoub v. Helm's Express, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Palumbo v. Western
Md. Ry., 271 F. Supp. 361 (D. Md. 1967).
- 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964).
4
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.601 (1950).
4"Id. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953).
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action on the ground that the parents, both Pennsylvania citizens, were
the real parties in interest, so that the wrongful death action could not
be heard in the federal court because there was no diversity. The court
held that the two actions could be tried together under a theory of pendent jurisdiction, because the operative facts in each case were identical,
as were the plaintiff and defendant, so that to try them together would
save the time of witnesses and parties, would protect the tortfeasor from
inconsistent judgments, and would make eminent good sense. "[T] he survival action is not federal but is based on diversity and to apply the Hum
v. Oursler principle of pendency where diversity of citizenship rather than
a federal question is the basis of jurisdiction is an extension, but one which
we think is desirable and should be countenanced by law." 9
Following Borror, a father was able to sue the maker of a power
mower in a diversity action for negligence which caused injury to his
son." The father's claim was for less than the jurisdictional amount and
only the claim of the son, which the father was also bringing in capacity
of next friend, could have reached the federal court independently. Nevertheless, the court allowed the father's claim to be appended to the son's.
In the above cases, a single plaintiff pursued the claims of two beneficiaries. The courts have also allowed two plaintiffs with claims based on
the same injury to join, even though one of the claims may lack the jurisdictional amount. 1 This practice had begun before Gibbs, and had been
justified on the theory of ancillary, as well as pendent, jurisdiction. 2 Since
Gibbs, there has been a tendency to refer to this permissive joinder as an
exercise of pendent jurisdiction.'
This joinder of plaintiffs where one has less than the jurisdictional
amount has thus far been confined to fact situations in which more than
one member of a family sues for an interest violated because of a wrong
to another member of the family. For example, a wife's suit for personal
injuries, which claims more than $10,000, may have joined with it a husband's suit for loss of consortium, which claims less. 4 Some courts require
the two claims to be interdependent; that is, that there be a law requiring
the two to be brought in the same suit." But this is not universally required. In one district court case, a wife sued for personal injuries suffered in childbirth as a result of a negligently performed sterilization
operation, and the husband's claim for hospital expenses ($684), even
though independent under state law, was joined."8 Even in the family re4 327 F.2d at 174.
"Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966).
" Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Morris v. Gimbel Bros., 246 F.
Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
" Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967); Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 261 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. I1. 1966); Raybould v. Mancini-Fattorre
Co., 186 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
63
Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Stone v Stone, 405 F.2d
94 (4th Cir. 1968); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968); Bishop v.
Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967).
4
" Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Morris v. Gimbell Bros., 246 F.
Supp 984 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
" Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
"Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967).
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lationship situation, however, courts will not allow the smaller claim to
be appended if there is a substantial divergence in the facts necessary to
establish the two claims, 7 and a recent case in the Ninth Circuit questions
the propriety of ever extending the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to
any joinder-of-party situation. "a
Thus, the primary result of the application of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction to diversity cases has been to allow a claim for less than the
jurisdictional amount to ride on the back of a sufficient claim in a case
where the facts are similar or identical. Pendent jurisdiction has not been
used to allow the aggregation of two insufficient claims to meet the jurisdictional amount, and recent developments make it unlikely that this will
happen any time soon." Similarly, pendent jurisdiction can not be used to
allow a plaintiff who is a citizen of the same state as the defendant to join
in a diversity action on the theory that his claim is pendent to that of the
diverse plaintiff, although there might be some dispute on this point.
In Newman v. Freeman" a child, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured by a motorist who was also a citizen of Pennsylvania. A guardian
from New Jersey was appointed to litigate the suit against the driver in
a federal court, thus creating a diversity case. The father then attempted
to join, and the defendant objected that the joinder of the father would
destroy diversity. The federal district court held that the father could
join, analogizing the case to those where an insufficient jurisdictional
amount rides on a claim that meets the amount requirement. Newman v.
Freeman represents the high-water mark of a remarkably permissive attitude by the Third Circuit toward the appointment of out-of-state
guardians for the sole purpose of creating diversity. The tolerance of the
circuit caused a swarm of such cases to be filed between 1954 and 1968. 1
Two years after Newman, however, Pennsylvania district courts began to
hold that parents could not be joined in the action pursued by the outof-state guardian.a When a mother, whose joinder was refused by the
district court, appealed, the court of appeals did not rule on the question
of whether she could be joined, but held that the entire suit could not be
maintained because the diversity was manufactured.' So, although the
Third Circuit has not expressly ruled that a nondiverse party may not be
joined with a diverse party in a suit where the facts underlying both claims
are identical, it has sorely discredited the one case that has so held. 4
5 Campbell v. City of Atlanta, 277 F. Supp. 395 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
aoHymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969).
asSee note 109 infra, and accompanying text.
00262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
""[T]he rivulet of 'manufactured' diversity cases has swollen to a stream of wide dimensions. . . . We are advised that one out-of-state citizen is the guardian in sixty-one pending
diversity cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania." McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 871
(3d Cir. 1968).
02 Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Greene v. Pennsylvania R.R., 280
F. Supp. 194 (M.D. Pa. 1968); Meyerhoffer v. E. Hanover Township School Dist., 280 F. Supp.
81 (M.D. Pa. 1968).
s8McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).
"For a detailed discussion of these cases, see 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
18.07, at
14 n.28 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).

1970]

COMMENTS

Joinder of Defendants. Three circuits have allowed a defendant who is
being sued for less than the jurisdictional amount to be appended in a
diversity action if a co-defendant is being sued for more and there is a
substantial overlapping of facts." All have agreed that the justification for
this joinder is the Gibbs case. In Stone v. Stone," for example, the grantor
of a trust claimed that her beneficiary had diverted approximately $8,000
worth of stock from one trust and aided another beneficiary in wrongfully
withholding an additional $5,000. In allowing the second beneficiary to
be joined, the court stated:
[W]e recognize, of course, that the question before us-whether a federal
court may exercise jurisdiction in a diversity case over a claim which in itself does not exceed $10,000-is not precisely the same as the question raised
under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-whether a federal court may take
jurisdiction in a federal question case over a claim based on state, not federal,
law. An apt analogy between the two is, however, at once apparent ...
[T]he question in both the federal question area and the diversity area is
whether a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a claim which, standing alone, would not meet the jurisdictional test.
We find the force of the analogy most compelling and therefore adopt the
approach enunciated by the Supreme Court in Gibbs."
Similarly, in Hatridge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co."' the wife of a
man injured in a traffic accident, allegedly through the negligence of defendant's insured, brought suit in the state court for loss of consortium.
She limited her claim for damages to $9,999.99 in a obvious effort to avoid
the federal courts where suits by other parties injured in the same accident
were faring poorly. Her action was removed to the federal court where it
was consolidated with the insurance company's action for a declaratory
judgment absolving it of liability to the husband. The court justified its
jurisdiction over the wife's claim on the theory that it was pendent to the
insurance company's claim for declaratory relief.
In all of the diversity cases allowing joinder of plaintiffs, and in the
above cases allowing joinder of defendants, there has been a requirement
that the pendent claim be based on facts nearly identical to or enclosed
within the allegations of the claim to which it is appended. It would be a
great exaggeration to say that pendent jurisdiction gives the court a general
power to allow or to force joinder of parties in all situations where there
is merely a common question of law or fact asserted by or against them.
The use of pendent jurisdiction to join parties where there is no tie between them, except related claims, has produced differing results. In Knuth
v. Erie-CrawfordDairy Cooperative Ass'n" the Third Circuit considered a
federal claim under the antitrust laws with claims against several defendants under state law joined to it. After finding the federal claim not insubstantial, the court continued: "[T]he allegations of Count III were
" Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d
94 (4th Cir. 1968); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968).
"405
F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968).
67
Id. at 97.
68415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969).
69 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968).
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based solely on a state claim asserted against certain non-diversity defendants. We fail to see how this ground is, in and of itself, sufficient to justify a refusal to exercise pendent jurisdiction. The situation mentioned is
quite common in pendent jurisdiction and is, indeed, the reason why pendent jurisdiction is invoked.""0
In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Craton7' a union sued
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,"a seeking a
declaratory judgment that would require the employer to pay the life insurance benefits the union claimed under the collective bargaining agreement. Alternatively, the union sought enforcement of the employer's commercial contract with a life insurance company which was a surety for the
employer. The court assumed pendent jurisdiction over the commercial
contract question." In another case with almost identical facts, a district
court dismissed that part of the union's suit which sought enforcement
of the surety contract between the employer and the insurance company,
holding that while the joinder could probably be justified on the strength
of Gibbs, to do so would not be a wise use of discretion. ' Other cases hold
there is not even power in the federal courts to allow joinder of a nondiverse defendant against whom no federal claim is stated.7" Thus, the
capacity to join nondiverse defendants against whom no federal claim is
stated continues to be cloudy. In diversity cases, a defendant cannot be
joined unless his joinder would not "destroy diversity." In federal question
cases, it is an open and disputed question whether an extra defendant
against whom no federal claim is stated can be added. A holding that the
defendant against whom no federal claim is stated may not be joined allows a fortuitous strategic advantage to such a defendant, since he can
probably intervene as of right if he wishes."
II.

JOINDER OF PARTIES NEEDED FOR JUST ADJUDICATION

AND INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT

Joinder of Parties under Rule 19. The 1966 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure removed some jurisdictional traps from multiparty suits. The change in the wording of rule 19"' and the subsequent case
'0 Id. at 427.
7t 4 0 5 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1968).
7229 U.S.C. S 185 (1964).
"'Accord, Shannon v. United States, 417 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1969).
7'Local 185 v. Copeland Elec. Co., 273 F. Supp. 547 (D. Mont. 1967); accord, Patrum v.
City of Greensburg, 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 1125 (1970).
"'Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969); Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756 (4th
Cir. 1968); Tucker v. Shaw, 308 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Wiley
Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Md. 1969).
"'Smith Pet. Service, Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1970); HardyLatham v. Wellons, 415 F.2d 674 (4th Cir. 1968).
17 Rule 19 formerly provided:
(a) Necessary joinder. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and of subdivision (b)
of this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be joined on
the same side as plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who should join as a
plaintiff refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff.
(b) Effect of Failure to Join. When persons who are not indispensable, but who ought
to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties, have
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law have changed the rule for joinder of what in the past have been called
"indispensable" and "necessary" parties. Two important functions were
served by the change. First, it became clear that whether a person is to
be joined, if feasible, does not depend on some technical concept, such as
whether he has a joint interest in a chose at stake.' Second, it is now clearer
what the status of the suit is after it has been determined that an absentee
who should be joined is unavailable." Some authorities had thought that
if an absentee fitted the description "indispensable," then the court's jurisdiction over the suit evaporated if he could not be joined." In Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson" the Supreme Court rejected
such an approach to the joinder of absentees.
Provident Tradesmens was a personal injury suit where the owner of a
car loaned it to two of his friends. While under the control of one of these
friends, the car crossed the median strip of a divided highway and collided
head-on with a truck. The administrator of the passenger's estate sued
the owner's insurer in a diversity action. The owner could not be joined,
not been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to both
service of process and venue and can be made parties without depriving the court
of jurisdiction of the parties before it, the court shall order them summoned to appear
in the action. The court in its discretion may proceed in the action without making
such persons parties, if its jurisdiction over them as to either service of process or
venue can be acquired only by their consent or voluntary appearance or if, though
they are subject to its jurisdiction, their joinder would deprive the court of jurisdiction of the parties before it; but the judgment rendered therein does not affect
the rights or liabilities of absent persons.

(c) Same: Names of Omitted Persons and Reasons for Non-Joinder to be Pleaded.
In any pleading in which relief is asked, the pleader shall set forth the names, if
known to him, of persons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded
between those already parties, but who are not joined, and shall state why they are
omitted.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 19.
Rule 19 now provides:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations
by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order
that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may
be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party
objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he
shall be dismissed from the action.

(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as described
in subdivision (a) (1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine
whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties
before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already
parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by
the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided;
third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth,
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder.
78
See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 70, at 298-302 (2d ed. 1970).
7 See note 81 infra, and accompanying text.
g See note 82 infra, and accompanying text.

" 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
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because his joinder would have destroyed diversity. The district court
heard the case with the owner absent, but the court of appeals ruled that
the owner of the car was an "indispensable party," and that the suit could
not proceed without him. " The Supreme Court reversed." Justice Harlan's
majority opinion criticized the approach of the court of appeals, because it
did not "follow the provision of rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that findings of 'indispensability' must be based on stated pragmatic considerations." 4 The Court discussed some of the "pragmatic considerations" which should have been weighed by the court of appeals.
Of these considerations, the availability of an adequate alternate forum
is most important. " The adequacy of the alternate forum should be evaluated, as should all of the relevant considerations, as of the time of the
making of the motion to dismiss.8" In Provident Tradesmens the question
of joinder was not raised until the appellate stage. Acknowledging that at
the trial level it might have been urged that the plaintiff had an alternate
forum in the state court, the Court said: "On appeal, if the plaintiff has
won, he has a strong additional interest in preserving his judgment."" One
court of appeals has gone significantly beyond this in holding that even if
the motion is made at trial, a party who properly should have been ruled
"indispensable" at trial ceases to be such if the outcome of the trial is one
that does not require his presence. 8
Among the other considerations to be weighed is the prejudice to the
movant or the prejudice to the absentee which will result from trial in his
absence. 8 It is clear from Provident Tradesmens that it will not be enough
to show that such prejudice is a mere legal possibility. There, the Court
based its decision partially on skepticism that the potential prejudice would
ever materialize. 8
Finally, the court must consider whether it can fashion an adequate
remedy in the absence of the party who cannot be joined. It is clear that
an 'adequate' remedy is one that will cause those present neither additional
liability nor additional litigation." One case illustrates that an "adequate"
remedy is not one that will settle the rights of those present and be harm8" Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 365 F.2d 802 (1968).
3

" Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
id. at 106-07.
' Prestenback v. Employers' Ins. Co., 47 F.R.D. 163 (E.D. La. 1969); Levin v. Mississippi River
Corp., 289 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8""Each of these interests must, in this case, be viewed entirely from an appellate perspective
since
87 the matter of joinder was not considered in the trial court." 390 U.S. at 109.
id. at 110.
S8Miller v. Miller, 406 F.2d 590 (10th Cir. 1969); accord, Godine v. Liberty Shoe Co., 396
84

F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1968).
8 See note 77 supra.
s",There remains, however, the practical

question whether Dutcher is likely to have any

need, and if so will have any opportunity to relitigate . . . . Upon examination, we find this
supposed threat neither large nor unavoidable." 390 U.S. at 114-15.
81""We read the Rule's . . . criterion, whether the judgment issued in the absence of the nonjoined person will be 'adequate,' to refer to this public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible, for clearly the plaintiff, who himself chose both the forum and the parties defendant,
will not be heard to complain about the sufficiency of relief obtainable against them." 390 U.S.
at 111.
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less as to those absent, but rather one that will put an end to litigation
over the matter."
Intervention as of Right. The 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure also clarified the position of one seeking to intervene as of
right. Rule 24 now provides: "Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action: . .. (2) when the applicant claims an
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest . . .,,"
Previous to this amendment, a party applying for intervention had to show
one of two justifications: that "[t]he representation of the applicant's
interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is
or may be bound by a judgment in the action;"" or that he "is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the
court or an officer thereof." 5
The previous rule set up two categories, each of which had a requirement that eliminated many applicants. The first required that the applicant show that he would be "bound" by the judgment of the court. To
show that he would be bound, the applicant had to demonstrate that
the court's judgment would be res judicata as to him in a subsequent
action." Two circuits have recognized that the elimination of the word
"bound" eliminated that rule, and have allowed intervention by parties
who claimed that a point of law in which they had a substantial interest
was being litigated for the first time."'
The second category required that the applicant have an interest in
"property." The Notes of Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amendment
reported that "some decided cases virtually disregarded the language of
this provision . . . . This development was quite natural, for Rule
24(a) (3) was unduly restricted. If an absentee would be substantially
affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, he
should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene, and his right to do
so should not depend on whether there is a fund to be distributed or otherwise disposed of."" The thrust of the new rule, then, is to allow intervention in situations where before there might have been difficulty.
The Indispensable Absentee and Intervention as of Right. The device of
intervention is designed to protect an absentee who might be prejudiced
2

" Broussard v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 398 F.2d 885
9
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) [emphasis added].
94Id. 24(a) (2).
95
Id. 24(a) (3).
"Sam Fox Pub. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1969).
Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1960).
" Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Atlantis
379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967).
as FEs. R. Civ. P. 24, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules,

1969).

(5th Cir. 1968).

See also Formulabs,

Inc. v.

Dev. Corp. v. United States,
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. V.,
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by the outcome of the suit. Rule 19(a) (2) (i) " also makes an absentee
who might be so prejudiced an indispensable party. It seems clear now
that any absent party who should be joined for just adjudication under
rule 19 (a) (2) (i) qualifies as one who may intervene as of right."' This
can provide a strategic advantage to an absentee if, for example, he cannot be joined because his joinder would destroy diversity ' or because the
venue as to him would be improper. Both these defenses are available to
an absentee who is an indispensable party, yet that same person can intervene without destroying diversity"' and can waive venue objections. However, this tactical advantage of the absentee is not secure. The fact that
the absentee has an interest in the outcome may give the court a lever to
force his intervention. There are two situations in which the courts may
have this leverage.
In one, the absent party is indispensable because he has an interest in
the suit which may be jeopardized by the outcome. Ordinarily, the courts
are to strive to protect his interests, and if they cannot adequately protect
him, they are to dismiss the suit. But when the absent party could intervene and remains absent to impede the suit, the court may be less fastidious in protecting him. In Smith v. American Federation of Musicians'"
a district court had to decide whether to proceed in a suit against the international union when the local could not be joined because of improper
venue. The court, after noting that the local would surely be prejudiced
by a judgment in its absence, elected to proceed with the action, noting
pointedly that the local was represented by the same counsel as was
representing the national, and was located quite near, though in another
jurisdiction, and so could intervene without substantial inconvenience.
This discounting of the interests of a party strategically absenting himself will be particularly appropriate for some diversity actions. A party
cannot be forcibly joined, no matter how important he is, if his joinder
would destroy the absolute diversity required in diversity actions. But that
same party can intervene as of right and his intervention does not destroy
diversity. Thus, if an absentee has an interest which may be impeded or
endangered by the suit, he may be persuaded to abandon his strategic
non-participation if he sees that the court is determined to proceed with-

out him.
In the second situation, the strategic absentee is confident that the outcome of the suit will not be detrimental to his interest, but his absence
will place one of the parties in peril of inconsistent judgments. Here it
may be more difficult to force the absentee to intervene. There is, however, the possibility that a party who has purposely absented himself from
a suit in which he might have intervened might be "bound" by the decision even though he is not a party. Thus, in Provident Tradesmens the
"FED.
R. Civ. P. 19.
"0 FED. R. Cirv. P. 24, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. V,
1969).
"' Miller v. Miller, 406 F.2d 590 (10th Cir. 1969).
1°2Id.; Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485
10347 F.R.D. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

(9th Cir. 1963).
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Court acknowledged that the absent owner was theoretically a peril to the

defendant, his insurer, and discussed such a possibility in these words:
If, as has happened, the three plaintiffs obtain a judgment against the insurance company, . . .Dutcher [the owner] may still claim that as a nonparty he is not estopped by that judgment from relitigating the issue. At that
point it might be argued that Dutcher should be bound by the previous
decision, because, although technically a nonparty, he had purposely bypassed
an adequate opportunity to intervene. We do not now decide whether such
an argument would be correct under the circumstances of this case. If,
however, Dutcher is properly foreclosed by his failure to intervene in the
present litigation, then the joinder issue considered in the Court of Appeals
vanishes, for any rights of Dutcher's have been lost by his own inaction.'

If the Supreme Court should someday decide that a strategic absentee
should lose the right to litigate an issue anew, then there will be few
absentees who will remain aloof from a suit. To change intervention as of
right to what would be compulsory intervention might be a hard rule
for an absentee who brings, for example, valid venue objections to being
joined. But there is little reason for allowing the absence of a diversity defendant who, as in Provident Tradesmens, has no real reason not to intervene except that it does not suit his purpose. In Provident Tradesmens there
was little inconvenience to the absentee, since he appeared as a witness and
obviously followed the suit closely." A rule of compulsory intervention
should distinguish between the strategic absentee and the absentee who
has other, valid reasons for remaining absent.
III. A

MORE RATIONAL APPROACH

0

As noted earlier," developments in the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction have received much criticism. The contention that federal jurisdiction is being expanded does not identify with sufficient precision the true
trend in federal jurisdiction, of which alteration of pendent jurisdiction
is only a part. A recent Supreme Court case shows that the antagonism
toward expansion of federal jurisdiction still has much validity.
In Snyder v. Harris. .. the Supreme Court was faced with a question
concerning class actions under the important new rule 23. The plaintiffs
in each action had an interest that was far less than the jurisdictional
amount, but the interest of the entire class in the action was for far more
than the necessary $10,000. Previously, aggregation had been allowed
only in what were labeled "true" class actions, where all members of the
class had a joint right or interest."' The appeals court had reasoned that
since the new rule 23 bound all members of the class who did not specifically exclude themselves from the suit, the "matter in controversy"
was more than the jurisdictional amount, even though the members of
1

"Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114 (1968).
105ld. at 106.
100 See notes 37-39 supra, and accompanying text.
'07394 U.S. 332

"'"True

(1969).

class actions were those in which the rights of the different class members were

common and undivided; in such cases aggregation was permitted." Id. at 335.
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the class did not have a "joint" interest in the amount.'0 ' The Supreme
Court reversed, stating that for aggregation to be allowed, it had always
been a requirement that the parties seeking to aggregate have a joint interest in the amount in controversy, and that this requirement had not
been abolished." ' Professor Wright.' sees this decision as a possible unwillingness of the Supreme Court to approve cases such as Jacobson v.
Atlantic City Hospital,"' where an action for less than the jurisdictional
amount was allowed as a rider in an action for more than the jurisdictional
amount and the facts of the two claims were nearly identical. The decision
in Snyder is not necessarily inconsistent with the jurisdictional rider cases.
In fact, the difference between the two may provide a paradigm of the
change in federal jurisdiction caused by the desire for "judicial economy."
When aggregation is allowed, there are two parties, neither of whom could
have gotten into the federal court alone, combining to make a federal
suit where none before existed. But in a rider case, the court only adds
additional work to a case it must hear in any event. As noted by the Court
in Snyder, the Rules must not be interpreted in a way that will expand
federal jurisdiction. There should not be the same antagonism toward reading the Rules in a way that will allow the court to hear all relevant aspects of a case properly before it.
This ability of a court to hear all relevant aspects of a case before it,
and to avoid cases where it cannot hope to settle the dispute once and for
all is often described by the phrase "judicial economy." This concept, and
the respect it commands today, has re-shaped federal jurisdiction in multiparty and multi-claim cases. The most important facet of this re-shaping
is that the question of whether to hear the suit has been removed from the
field of jurisdiction. When the Supreme Court in Provident Tradesmens
emphasized the pragmatic considerations which should be considered in
deciding a question of dismissal for non-joinder of an important absentee,
it placed this question outside "jurisdictional" lines. Now when a court
decides to proceed with such an action, it is not deciding a point of law;
it is making a discretionary choice. Its choice is not irrevocable, and there
is no need for the court to maintain that its choice would be the same if
it were forced to choose at a different point in the litigation. In pendent
jurisdiction, both Gibbs and Rosado mark a similar migration from the
zone of jurisdiction to the zone of discretion. The Supreme Court has now
ruled that there is power in the federal court to hear a pendent claim if
it arises from the same nucleus of operative facts as the federal claim. This
test has so expanded the power of the courts to hear pendent claims that
relatively few cases have been decided on the issue of power."' The courts
have made discretionary choices based on a number of factors: Whether it
considers the federal claim a sincere one, or just a "gate pass" into the
"° Gas Service Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831
"0394 U.S. 332, 335 (1968).
.. Wright,

(10th Cir. 1968).

Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Proposals, 26

WASH. & LEE L. REv. 185, 197 (1969).

1"392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968).
"s' Weiss v. Sunasco, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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federal court in order to litigate the state claim;' 14 the amount of time al-

ready expended in hearing the non-federal claim;". and the crowded conditions of the dockets in an alternate forum. 16 Only rarely have the courts
felt it necessary to discuss the threshold question of power to hear the nonfederal claim."'
Jurisdictional traps in multi-party litigation remain. An indispensable
party cannot be joined forcibly if his joinder would destroy diversity.
A defendant may bring in a third party not diverse to the plaintiff without destroying diversity, but there is authority to the effect that the
plaintiff may not state a claim against that third party without destroying diversity." 8 Nevertheless, despite the traps that remain, it is generally
true that one who would have the court add another facet to a suit, or
one who opposes such a move, must now come before the court not to
argue the power of the court to do so, but to show that the move will
decrease litigation, make proper use of judicial resources, and settle the
dispute as rapidly and as fairly as any other possible suit in any other
forum. Broadly viewed, the concept of judicial economy has helped to
make multi-party, multi-claim litigation less arcane and more rational.

114 A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods., 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968); McCall v. Shapiro, 292
F. Supp. 268 (D. Conn. 1968).
11"A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968); Research Frontiers,
Inc. v. Marks Polarized Corp., 290 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
, General Foods Corp. v. Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp., 297 F. Supp. 271 (D. Del. 1969).
117 Weiss v. Sunasco, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
.. Schwab v. Erie L.R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Ayoub v. Helm's Express,
Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473

(W.D. Pa. 1969).

